# Motivation to Serve the Public: Testing the Measures and Exploring the Antecedents in Local Government

Jeffrey R. Paine
Visiting Professor in Environmental Studies and Political Studies
University of Illinois at Springfield
Contact:
10022 Gilreath Road
Chatham, IL 62629
(217)899-2206
jpain01s@uis.edu

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#### Abstract

This article seeks to replicate and extend Perry's (1997) initial study of possible antecedents of public service motivation. It does this by testing the antecedents identified in the 1997 study, as well as extending the study to additional possible antecedents. It also extends the work by relating these potential antecedents with two other sources of motivation: material self-interest and task motivation. Each of the three motivations have different theoretical effects, and each would be expected to arise from different antecedents, or the same antecedents with differing intensities of relationship.

Using regression analysis of data collected through a survey of 1,069 elected township officials in 138 townships in 10 Illinois counties (usable response N = 507, or 47.4 percent) this study finds substantial differences in the strength and direction of relationship between the predictors and public service motivation reported in 1997 and in the current data. Extension beyond the 1997 study included additional antecedent predictors and two other measures of motivation. All three measures appear to be related to some degree to the proposed antecedents, although the intensity and significance of each predictor differs between the three response variables.

## Introduction

From whence does the motivation to serve in government or other public positions arise? Perry and Wise (1990) and Perry (1996, 1997, 2000) argue that there is something different about the individuals who seek out positions in the public sector, compared to those who prefer the private sector. This difference is termed the public service motivation, and is offered as an alternative explanation to rational choice theory, which is framed as the predominant explanation

of individual behavior. Later, Lee and Olshfski (2002) offered task motivation as a better explanation of individual service, at least for some public employees and volunteers. Paine (2009) demonstrates through factor analysis that measures derived from each of the three theories can be used to measure motivation to work among elected officials in a local government setting, using the same dataset used in this analysis.

Perry (1997) introduced the idea that motivation, at least in the case of public service motivation, might arise through the individual's socialization in such institutions as the family, church, and professional background. The current study seeks to replicate Perry's (1997) work by testing nine of the original eleven socialization factors, which he termed "antecedents," in a different population of individuals engaged in public service, specifically, elected township officials. This study also seeks to extend the set of socialization factors by including a number of previously untested factors to determine how well they relate to the public service motivation construct.

In addition, since the measures of material self-interest and task motivation explored in Paine (2009) were both found to describe the unseen construct of motivation, as does Perry's (1996) measure of public service motivation, the current study will extend this line of research by looking into the relationship between antecedent factors and these measures, as well. From a theoretical perspective, if socialization antecedents contribute to the development of public service motivation, then they should also contribute to the development of material self-interest and task motivation. Each of these three derives from a different theoretical model of human behavior. Public service motivation posits that individuals seek jobs with organizations that will provide opportunities to satisfy or fulfill their internal needs or deficiencies related to serving the public. Material self-interest, originating in rational choice theory, proposes that individuals

consider their options and pursue the one that will maximize their material benefits—and therefore will only select public service if that is the opportunity that will maximize those personal benefits. Finally, task motivation suggests that individuals identify with and commit to a particular job and role, as it fits within the context of their own life situation—and therefore, as in the case of firefighters, become a public servant because they identify with the job and role, and would therefore be unwilling to take on a different public job or role. Because of the theoretical differences between the three kinds of motivation, it seems intuitive that there would be differences between the three in terms of which antecedents affect each of the motivations, and/or the intensity of that effect.

Of course, these three do not represent all of the conceptions of motivation that could be tested. Lasswell (1948) suggested that a desire for power explains essentially all interest in public service. Others, such as McClelland (1951; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953) suggested a number of learned needs, including needs for power, affiliation, achievement, and autonomy, among others. Clearly, other conceptions of motivation need to be tested, beyond the three included in the current study.

Socialization is of course only one of the possible origins of motivation. Another possibility is genetic inheritance. Inherited traits could lead to a desire to serve, whether for altruistic (public service motivation), self-interest (rational choice), or personal identification (task motivation) reasons. There is a small but growing literature that suggests that to some degree an individual's behavioral makeup comes from inherited genetic factors, including some portion of the individual's mental abilities, tastes, emotions and personality. Studies of various mental traits and abilities using twins suggest that approximately half of the variance in any psychological traits are attributable to genes (Rushton, 2004; Alford, Funk and Hibbing, 2005).

If any such traits were related to a motivation to work, and specifically a motivation to serve the public in some manner, they would probably be detectable as patterns of service in a family over several generations. Studies on pro-social behavior (Rushton, 2004), political orientations (Alford, Funk and Hibbing, 2005), and economic behavior (Wallace, Cesarini, Lichtenstein and Johannesson, 2007) support this notion. Fascinating as this possibility is, it is not tested in the current study, although it is mentioned here because family-related antecedents could be transmitted through genetics, socialization, or both.

Perry and Wise (1990) and Perry (1996, 1997, 2000) describe public service motivation as consisting of three types of motives: those based in rational but non-material self-interest, such as support for particular policy options or a desire to participate in the decision-making process; those motives based in norms of behavior, such as the notion of civic duty or a commitment to supporting the public interest; and motives rooted in emotions, such as patriotism or a compassionate desire to help the less fortunate. While there could be a genetic component for these types of motives, it is also likely that socialization, including education and social learning may play a part in the individual developing a motivation that can be satisfied by serving in government positions.

Thus, Perry (1997) selected a set of 11 possible antecedents—acknowledging that the universe of possible antecedents was much larger—including four control variables (age, gender, education level and income). The seven primary predictors tested included church involvement, closeness to God, religious worldview, parental modeling, parental relations, professional identification, and political ideology. All but religious worldview and parental relations received some support in the model. However, the strength of the model was moderate at best, with a reported  $R^2$  of 0.13 (F = 3.96, significance 0.00) using the complete 24-item instrument. As

Perry noted, "the variables studied here fall far short of providing a comprehensive explanation for the variance in PSM [public service motivation]," (1997, p.190). By including a larger and more varied selection of possible socialization antecedents as predictors, the current study may improve the ability to explain the variance in public service motivation, as well as the other measures of motivation.

To test different theories of motivation, a survey was constructed that included three instruments measuring motivation, as well as a number of other items collecting personal and demographic information about the respondents. The first theory tested was Public Service Motivation (Perry, 1996, 2000; Perry and Wise, 1990), by including the 24 items of Perry's (1996) Public Service Motivation instrument. The second theory tested was Material Self-Interest, using items from the Public Service Motivation instrument and other instruments to create a new instrument. The third theory tested was Task Motivation (Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999), using a four-item job commitment and role identification instrument proposed by Lee and Ohlshfski (2002).

Public service motivation theory suggests that individuals have needs or deficiencies that can be met by holding jobs in organizations that serve the public, such as government agencies and nonprofit organizations. Perry and Wise (1990) and Perry (1996, 1997, 2000) suggest that individuals might be socialized into motivation to serve in public organizations.

Material self-interest, often called rational choice theory, on the other hand suggests that individuals consider their options and pursue the one that will maximize their personal benefits while minimizing their personal costs. Thus, we would assume that individuals are either acting based on inherited traits (a possibility that cannot be tested in the current data) or are socialized into recognizing government service as a valid means for meeting personal material needs.

Finally, task motivation implies that individuals identify and commit first and foremost with the task of the job and the role it holds in the context of the organization and the individual's life. Thus, we would expect that individuals either have an inherent need to carry out and identify themselves with certain tasks, or they have been socialized into seeing themselves as fulfilling the task and role that they select as a public employee or official.

## Variables and Hypotheses

This tests several proposed antecedents regarding socialization of motivation for service, including attempting to replicate Perry's (1997) findings relating to several of the measures, while extending the set of measures to include other possible antecedents.

The criterion variables for this analysis measure the intensity of individual motivation for service along three different axes of motivation: public service motivation, material self-interest, and task motivation. Each of the three is measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale, with the responses to a number of separate items indexed to create an interval measure amenable to regression analysis. The public service motivation variable is measured using a 24-item instrument developed by Perry (1996). Material self-interest is measured with a three-item instrument, using items from the public service motivation instrument that have face appropriateness as measures of material self-interest when scored in the opposite manner than for public service motivation (Paine, 2009).

A total of 22 predictor variables are included in the current analysis. Five are related to general socialization, eight focus on political influences, and nine are demographic and positional controls. Of the 11 proposed antecedent predictors tested by Perry (1997), nine were supported, and were included in the survey instrument for the current study as a means of testing

the earlier work in a different population and setting. Because Perry (1997) found little support for the religious worldview and parental relations scales as predictors, they were not included in the current survey in the interest of saving space in the survey instrument for items related to other variables of interest.

Political ideology was measured along a five-point ordinal scale, from very liberal (scored 1) to politically neutral (scored 3) to very conservative (scored 5), which may be treated as a near-interval scale for the purposes of this regression analysis. Perry (1997) found no relationship with PSM, and no prediction is made about the direction of relationship with any of the three criterion variables.

In Perry (1997), professional identification was a four-item instrument. Because of an interest in local aspects of government service, one original item was split into two, and both were included in the instrument. Even though Perry (1997) found no evidence of a relationship, it was predicted that professional identification would be positively related to PSM, as well as to task motivation, but negatively associated with material self-interest.

Perry (1997) included parental modeling of altruistic behavior because families are the primary context of socialization in American society, and some evidence exists that parental modeling results in increased pro-social behavior among children. The 11 items of the scale were scored using a 5-point Likert-type scale and indexed for use in the regression models. Parental modeling should be related to PSM, but no prediction is made about the other two response variables.

Closeness to God is a measure consisting of six items relating to different aspects of the individual's feelings about the divine and its relationship to various activities. Again, the items are scored on a 5-point Likert-type scale and indexed for regression. Perry found a strong

relationship between this predictor and PSM. It was therefore predicted that the relationship would be positive to PSM, negative to material self-interest, while no prediction was made about task motivation.

The church involvement measure used by Perry (1997) consisted of four yes/no items that were added together (with yes = 1 and no = 0) to create a near-interval (with values ranging from 0 [indicating only "no" responses] to 4 [indicating "yes" responses to all four items]) index variable for use in the regression models. Perry found a significant negative relationship to PSM, and therefore it was expected that the relationship would be negative in the current data as well. It was predicted that material self-interest would also be negatively related, as self-interested individuals would in theory be less willing to devote effort to a church. No prediction was made about task motivation.

This study also tested measures of several new possible antecedents, thus extending Perry's (1997) work about possible antecedents to public service motivation and government service.

Political party affiliation was measured using indicator variables (Democratic or Independent/Other), while Republican was the comparison group. There is no clear theoretical basis for predicting that individuals affiliated with any of the party designations will score significantly higher or lower on any of the three criterion variables. However, Republican interest in smaller government and lower taxes, as well as support for business interests, might result in lower public service motivation scores and higher material self-interest scores, while Democratic support for larger and more active government might result in the opposite.

Being politically active was measured with a dummy variable asking whether the individual considered themselves active in a local political party, with not being active the

comparison group. While there is no clear theoretical basis for assuming so, it is possible that individuals who are motivated to be active within a political party might also be motivated to serve in government as well. Individuals who are self-motivated are probably less likely to be politically involved, so a negative relationship should be visible. No prediction is made regarding task motivation.

Respondents were also asked to identify a number of categories of relatives who have run for elected office in the past. These categories were condensed into a dummy variable, measuring whether any relative had ever run for elected office, where the comparison group was those who did not have a relative who ran for office. The presence of relatives who have run for office could indicate an inherited or socialized sense of public service, although there is no clear theoretical basis for this assumption. No prediction was made for the direction of relationship for this variable and the three criterion variables.

A final category related to politics was investigated: personal expression of political culture. Based on Elazar's (1970, 1972) typology of political culture, Dran, Albritton and Wykoff (1990) developed a short instrument to identify how well an individual matches the moralistic (four items), individualistic (three items) and traditionalistic (two items) cultural paradigms. Each item is measured with a 5-point Likert-type scale, which is then indexed to give an interval measure of the particular political culture. The cultural types are not exclusive, so an individual can have similar or disparate scores on the three scales. Moralistic political culture views government service as the duty of every citizen, and therefore should be positively related to PSM and negatively related to material self-interest. No prediction was made for task motivation. Individualistic political culture views politics as a rough-and-tumble competition that is best dealt with by professionals and others who have the proper talents for the arena. Thus, a

negative relationship is expected with PSM, a positive relationship with material self-interest, and no prediction is made for task motivation. Finally, Traditionalistic political culture views government and politics as the province of society's traditional leaders: social, political and economic elites. Therefore, a highly traditionalistic individual might display a high degree of PSM and a low degree of material self-interest. No prediction was made regarding task motivation.

Finally, the individual respondent's sense of community was tested. Long and Perkins (2002) refined the brief sense of community instrument from a somewhat longer original sense of community instrument developed by MacMillan and Chavis (1986). The Long and Perkins instrument originally consisted of eight items, but was revised into nine for this survey because of confusing wording in one of the items. The items were further modified to fit the township setting of the current study, instead of the urban block of the original. Each item was measured with a 5-point Likert-type scale, which was then indexed to give an interval measure. Given the setting of the individuals as officials in a local unit of government, it was expected that sense of community would be positively related to PSM, negatively related to material self-interest, and because of its contextual focus on the role of the job in the community, positively related to task motivation.

In addition to these predictor variables, a number of control variables were also included in the analysis. These included age, gender, education level, income, current or past military service, and a set of dummy variables concerning the township position held by the individual. The first four of these were also included in Perry (1997). Of those, only education was significantly found to be related to PSM. No predictions were made about the relationship of these variables to the response variables.

Age was measured using a six-step near-interval ordinal scale, grouped in roughly 15-year cohorts. The exception to this was the youngest category, which included individuals under the age of 18, and the second category, which included individuals between the ages of 18 and 30. The highest category was for individuals aged 76 and older.

Gender was a dummy variable, with female as the comparison group.

Education level was measured with a six-point ordinal scale, ranging from the lowest category of grade school or some high school, a high school diploma or equivalent, some college or technical training, a bachelor degree, a master degree, and education beyond a master degree.

Personal income was measured using a six-step near-interval ordinal scale. The lowest category was for annual earnings of less than \$15,000 per year; the following categories increased by intervals of \$10,000; and the highest category was for incomes above \$55,000 per year.

Past or current military service was a dummy variable, with those not having military service as the comparison group.

A set of indicator variables related to township position was included to control for differences in the duties of the positions. The four positions were classified as supervisor, clerk, highway commission and assessor. The comparison group was township trustees.

## Methodology

Of the 1,069 surveys circulated to township officials in the 138 townships in 10 Illinois counties, total response was 518, with 11 unusable forms returned, leaving a valid response of n = 507 and a response rate of 47.4 percent. The data were analyzed for evidence of potential

problems, such as outliers and violations of the assumptions of linearity and normality (Elliott and Woodward, 2007; Osborne and Overbay, 2004; Osborne and Waters, 2002).

Multiple linear regression was selected as the proper method of analysis, as the purpose of the analysis was to determine the relationship between each of the criterion variables and the set of predictor variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). Each of the three criterion variables were regressed separately on the set of predictors: essentially, a multivariate multiple regression. This method obviates concerns about correlation between the criterion variables (Mertler and Vannatta, 2002).

## **Data and Results**

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the data. In regression analysis, care must be taken to minimize violations of assumptions about the data being analyzed. This includes reviewing the data for evidence of problems with outliers, linearity, and normality.

# [INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The data were inspected for outliers. Outliers are important in a regression analysis because even a single outlier may significantly bias the results of the analysis in a positive or negative manner (Osborne and Overbay, 2004; Mertler and Vanatta, 2002). While several outliers were identified, their effects appear to be minimal and mostly reduce the strength of observed relationships, rather than overstate them. No substantial problems were identified with linearity by examining the scatterplots. Examination of the correlation matrix, as well as the tolerance and VIF scores, suggest no significant problems with multicollinearity.

Analysis of scatterplots and assessment of skewness and kurtosis statistics identify some potential normality problems with several variables. However, given the size of the sample, it is possible to assert the central limit theorem, which suggests that when there is a large N of cases, violations of normality will be minimal, even when individual variables are decidedly non-normal in their distribution (Mertler and Vannatta, 2002).

# Replication of the 1997 study

The first purpose of this study was to attempt to replicate the findings of Perry (1997). Table 2 compares the regression results of the 1997 and current studies. The 1997 study found that only four of the eleven predictors included in the regression model were significant in explaining the results for the full public service motivation instrument, with a reported R<sup>2</sup> of just 0.13. The current study, using nine of Perry's original 11 predictors, attained an R<sup>2</sup> of 0.40, with nine predictors reaching significance. Of the four significant predictors in the 1997 model (closeness to God, parental modeling, church involvement, and education), only two were significant in the current model (closeness to God and parental modeling). In addition, three other predictors that were not significant in the 1997 study were found to be significant in the current study (professional identification, political ideology, and age). Clearly, the results of the current study only partially support Perry's 1997 results, but just as clearly, the current findings support the notion that public service motivation is in part socialized into the individual.

## [INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Intuitively, the source of some of the difference between the two studies could originate in the differences between the study samples. While Perry (1996, 1997) describes the

respondents as being from "a variety of primarily public sector backgrounds," (1996, p.11), the descriptive statistics for the 11 groups or types (e.g., MPA students, sheriff's deputies, federal defense managers) were not reported. However, it is clear that the groups listed are diverse in terms of education, duties, responsibilities, institutional settings, and likely, individual backgrounds. In contrast, in the current study, the individuals surveyed represented one group, elected township officials, the five types of which have different duties and responsibilities, but all serve the same constituency and governmental organization, and work within the same institutional framework.

The most significant differences between the 1997and current studies are the relationships for the predictors of professional identification and political ideology. In the 1997 study, professional identification was significantly associated with three of the four dimensions of PSM, although it was not significant for the overall scale. While the current study does not look at the dimensional structure of PSM, it is clear that there is a strong relationship in the data to the full scale, while such was not the case in the earlier study. Perry (1997) speculated about the "alienation of professionals from politics" (p. 190) as an explanation for his respondents having a negative relationship with the policymaking subscale. While the available data in this study cannot resolve the question, the fact that township officials must undergo the political test of election to achieve their current position may explain the positive relationship of professionalism to the PSM measure. It seems intuitive that professional identification would be important to an administrative officer, whether elected or appointed, as a professional is by definition a person engaged in an occupation or vocation that requires specialized knowledge and skill, and therefore would be expected to exhibit a concern for the reputation and progress of the

profession as a whole (Oxford English Dictionary, 2008). That is, a concern for one's profession is perhaps akin to one's concern and interest in serving their community.

Many professional organizations encourage service to the community as well as the profession among their members, so it is perhaps not surprising that of 488 respondents providing the information, 228 (47 percent) identified themselves as members of professional organizations related to both their township duties and to other jobs or professions, while another 96 (20 percent) are members of township-related organizations alone, and 40 (8 percent) are members of organizations related to other professions alone. Only 124 (25 percent) do not claim membership in any professional organization. Membership in a township-related professional organization, however, may be considered a result of holding a public office, not a cause of holding that office. Still, once in office, a professional organization can encourage and reinforce individual attitudes and behavior toward public service. Clearly, professional membership does play an important role in motivation to serve in this population, as 55 percent of respondents are members of professional organizations that are not related to township duties and 75 percent are members of both kinds of organization.

The political nature of the township positions in this study may also account for the strong relationship between political ideology and public service motivation. As described above, political ideology was measured by dividing a continuous spectrum of ideology (ranging from very liberal on the low end to very conservative on the high end) into five roughly interval divisions. In the current study, the relationship is negative, which means that as individual respondents become increasingly conservative, they have generally lower scores on the PSM instrument. As will be discussed below, individuals who cite an affiliation with the Democratic party are likely to have higher PSM scores compared to those citing Republican affiliation. As

conservatives and Republicans in America tend to have negative views of government, the relationship between ideology and PSM is on its face not surprising.

# Extension from 1997 study

The second purpose of this study was to extend Perry's original research to include a larger set of possible antecedents (13 additional predictors not included in the 1997 study), as well as to compare how the entire set of 22 predictors related to the three measures of motivation in this study: PSM, material self-interest, and task motivation. Table 3 displays the three regression models. The R<sup>2</sup>s of these three regression models were substantially larger than the 0.13 reported for PSM in 1997, with the expanded set of predictors accounting for just more than half of the variance in PSM, almost a quarter of the variance in material self-interest, and almost half of the variance in task motivation.

## [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

**Public Service Motivation.** For PSM, only two of the four significant predictors identified by Perry (1997) were significant in this study (parental modeling and closeness to God), while two others that were not significant in the 1997 study were found to be significant in this sample (professional identification and political ideology). In addition, five other predictors that had not been included in the 1997 study (sense of community, political activity, Democratic affiliation, and Moralistic and Individualist political cultures) were found to be significant.

While both parental modeling and closeness to God were significant in relation to PSM in the current study, both displayed betas that were considerably smaller than reported in Perry (1997). This suggests that while important as antecedents to PSM, they are not as relevant as the

original study suggested. This reduction of course could be attributed to differences in the study population, as well as to the presence of predictors that are more relevant to the development and expression of PSM. However, two variables present and non-significant in the 1997 study are significant in the current study: professional identification and political ideology, which were discussed above. Again, the differences between the two studies could be attributed to differences in the population, but such a comparison is not possible because no descriptive statistics were reported in 1997.

Finally, the pattern of the five new significant predictors suggests that politics is important to public service. First, individuals appear to have a strong sense of identification with their community. This is hardly surprising, since the positions held are oriented toward the local geographical community as a political and service unit. Individuals' PSM scores are also significantly and positively related to being more liberal, being politically active, and affiliating with the Democratic party. We might anticipate that individuals who are politically active will be associated with service motivation, as the individuals must have a desire to serve in order to go to the time, expense and effort to run for office. The liberal/Democratic trend might be measures of the same tendency, which of its face could be a belief in larger, more active government when compared to conservatives/Republicans. Finally Moralistic political culture (positively related to PSM) reflects a belief that participation in politics and government is everyone's duty, while the Individualistic culture (negatively related to PSM) reflects a belief that participation in politics is a dirty business that is best left to political and governmental professionals.

**Material Self-interest.** Almost all of the predictors, whether significant or not, were negatively related to the measure of material self-interest. Only five of the 22 predictors were significant in this model. Since the material self-interest measure is in a sense the opposite of the

PSM measure, it is not surprising that these relationships are negative while the same predictors are positively associated with PSM. Four of the five (sense of community, closeness to God, professional identification and Moralistic political culture) were significant with both PSM and material self-interest, while Traditionalistic political culture was only significant with material self-interest.

On its face, it appears to make sense that self-motivated individuals would have a lower sense of involvement or relation to their communities, and might be less involved in professional organizations and activities. Even the sense of closeness to God suggests that the individual who scores higher on self-interest is less concerned about "larger" relationships, such as with the divine. Since Moralistic political culture suggests that individuals should consider public participation and service their duty, a self-motivated individual would likely not hold such views. However, self-interest is also negatively associated with Traditionalistic political culture. The Traditionalistic view holds that politics and government are the province of the appropriate elite; self-oriented individuals are unlikely to be concerned about traditional arrangements and elite interests, unless of course the individual benefits from such arrangements.

**Task Motivation.** Only five predictor variables were associated with the task motivation measure. Sense of community, professional identification and being a highway commissioner were significantly and positively related to task motivation, while being a political independent (compared to affiliating with the Republican party) and having a higher Individualistic political culture score were significant and negatively related.

Individuals scoring high on task motivation are committed to the particular job they hold, and identify themselves with the role of that job in the workplace and the community. It therefore makes face sense that there should be a strong relationship (Beta = 0.56, or roughly 31

percent of the variance in the model) between the sense of community and task motivation. Since the individual identifies with their job and its role, they would also likely see themselves as professional, and thus have higher professional identification.

The two political predictors are more problematic, however. Political independents are likely to have lower task motivation scores than those affiliated with the Republican party; the reason for this is not intuitively clear. Individuals with higher Individualistic political culture scores also have lower task motivation scores. Perhaps distaste for the dirty world of politics and government could be associated with political independence, but the analysis does not make that clear. Perhaps individuals who are motivated by a task and role reject political membership and are willing to take on the job and its role based on its own merits, rather than its perceived involvement in the world of politics and government.

Only two of the 22 predictors are significant in all three of the models: sense of community and professional identification. Both are positively associated with both PSM and task motivation, and negatively associated with material self-interest.

Fulfilling the second purpose of this study—testing the relationship of the expanded set of antecedents on PSM and the other two measures of motivation—shows that indeed, the three measures of motivation may be associated with different combinations of predictors, but the analysis also shows that sense of community and professional identification may be the most important factors in explaining all three kinds of motivation.

#### **Discussion and Conclusion**

This study had two purposes: first, to replicate Perry's (1997) study of public service motivation and possible antecedents; and second, to extend that study's methodology to include

additional sources of socialization, and to compare public service motivation to two other measures of motivation.

The results of the current study are considerably different than the results reported in Perry (1997), with five predictors in the current model and four in the prior study. Three of the five were not significant in the 1997 study. Finally, the R<sup>2</sup> is greatly improved, from 0.13 to 0.40. It appears likely that differences in the study samples may account for much of the different, although descriptive statistics of the respondents were not reported in the 1997 study, so no comparison can be made. While the results were not repeated exactly, the current study reinforces the conceptual model that proposes that socialization plays a significant role in the development of motivation to serve in public organizations.

The study extends the set of antecedents and adds two additional models of motivation.

The results also suggest that socialization through such institutions as family, religion, schools, community, and profession plays an important role in the development of motivation, which may then be expressed by direction, intensity and duration of effort. Future studies in this vein might test additional models of motivation, such as a desire for power, or learned needs such as those for achievement, affiliation, or autonomy, and further test and expand the set of possible antecedents. Such expanded findings would likely have implications for the selection and retention of individuals seeking positions in public service, especially for management practices in public sector organizations.

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Table 1. Descriptive statistics

					Parent	Sense of	Church	Closeness to	Profess.	Political
		PSM	MSI	TM	Modeling	community	Involv.	God	ldent.	Ideology
N	Valid	425	486	495	465	487	462	461	471	488
	Missing	82	21	12	42	20	45	46	36	19
Mean		3.66	2.46	4.30	3.63	3.87	3.59	3.90	3.31	3.4
Std. Error	of Mean	.02	.03	.02	.03	.02	.05	.03	.03	.04
Median		3.67	2.33	4.25	3.71	3.88	4.00	4.00	3.40	3.00
Mode		3.46	2.00	4.00	3.71	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.40	3.00
Std. Deviation		.38	.59	.54	.56	.46	.99	.71	.56	.80
Variance		.15	.35	.29	.32	.21	.98	.51	.31	.64
Skewness	;	.02	.02	49	29	37	80	38	04	41
Std. Error	of Skewness	.12	.11	.11	.11	.11	.11	.11	.11	.11
Kurtosis		.31	.19	15	.30	.24	.34	.50	.34	.53
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.24	.22	.22	.23	.22	.23	.23	.23	.22
Range		2.58	3.33	2.50	3.14	2.75	4.00	4.00	3.60	4.00
Minimum		2.38	1.0	2.50	1.86	2.25	1.00	1.00	1.40	1.00
Maximum		4.96	4.33	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00

Table 1. Continued

	•	Politically	•	-	Family	Moralistic	Individualistic	Traditional.		
		active	Democrat	Independ.	Politicians	Pol. Cult.	Pol. Cult.	Pol. Cult.	Superv	Clerks
N	Valid	493	478	478	483	491	493	481	507	507
	Missing	14	29	29	24	16	14	26	0	0
Mean		.48	.38	.16	.60	3.04	1.96	3.19	.13	.14
Std. Erro	r of Mean	.02	.02	.02	.02	.03	.03	.04	.01	.02
Median		.00	.00	0.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	.00	.00
Mode		0	.00	.00	1.00	3.33	2.00	3.00	.00	.00
Std. Deviation		.50	.49	.36	.49	.58	.56	.79	.33	.34
Variance		.25	.24	.13	.24	.34	.32	.63	.11	.12
Skewnes	ss	.09	.47	1.89	42	18	.26	08	2.23	2.13
Std. Erro	r of Skewness	.11	.11	.112	.11	.11	.11	.11	.11	.11
Kurtosis		-2.00	-1.78	1.59	-1.83	19	25	24	2.99	2.54
Std. Erro	r of Kurtosis	.22	.22	.22	.22	.22	.22	.22	.22	.22
Range		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.75	4.00	1.00	1.00
Minimum	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.33	1.00	1.00	0.00	.00
Maximum	n	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.33	3.75	5.00	1.00	1.00

Table 1. Continued

			Highway					Military
		Assessors	Comm.	Age	Gender	Education	Income	Service
N	Valid	507	507	485	484	489	441	495
	Missing	0	0	22	23	18	66	12
Mean		.09	.11	4.46	.72	3.06	4.22	.24
Std. Erro	r of Mean	.01	.01	.04	.02	.05	.08	.02
Median		.00	.00	4.00	1.00	3.00	4.00	.00
Mode		.00	.00	4.00	1.00	3.00	6.00	.00
Std. Deviation		.29	.31	.82	.45	1.07	1.06	.43
Variance		.09	.10	.67	.20	1.15	2.58	.18
Skewnes	S	2.78	2.53	.02	98	.85	42	1.22
Std. Erro	r of Skewness	.11	.11	.11	.11	.11	.12	.11
Kurtosis		5.74	4.40	17	-1.05	.86	-1.00	52
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.22	.22	.22	.22	.22	.23	.22
Range		1.00	1.00	4.00	1.00	5.00	5.00	1.00
Minimum		.00	.00	2.00	.00	1.00	1.00	.00
Maximum		1.00	1.00	6.00	1.00	6.00	6.00	1.00

Table 2. Comparison of regressions: Perry (1997) and current study

	PS	SM	PS	M	
	Perry 1997		Current Study		
	Beta	Sig	Beta	Sig	Notes
	(Std.		(Std.		
	Error)		Error)		
Parental	.20	.00	.12	.01	
modeling	(.07)		(.04)		
Church	17	.01	07	.17	Same direction, but
involvement	(.07)		(.02)		not significant
Closeness to	.30	.00	.34	.00	
God	(.07)		(.03)		
Professional	.03	.60	.37	.00	Beta increased,
identification	(.06)		(.03)		became significant
Political	.00	.95	25	.00	Beta increased
ideology	(.06)		(.02)		(negative) and
					became significant
Age	.12	.10	.12	.01	Became significant
	(80.)		(.02)		
Gender	08	.19	06	.18	
	(.06)		(.04)		
Education	.13	.03	.01	.85	Beta decreased,
	(.06)		(.02)		dropped from
					significance
Income	15	.07	.05	.31	Change in direction,
	(80.)	_	(.01)		still not significant
N	295		328		
R2	.13		.4	-	
F	3.96		23.		
Significance	.00		.00		

Table 3. Comparison of regressions for three measures of motivation

Beta   Sig   Beta   Sig   Beta   Sig   Beta   Sig		PSM		MS	SI	TM			
Parental modeling									
Community	Parental modeling					02			
Sense of   27	<b>G</b>	(.03)		(.06)		(.05)			
Church	Sense of		.00		.00		.00		
involvement (.02) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.05) (.04) (.03) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.02) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.07) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06)	community	(.04)		(.07)		(.05)			
Closeness to God         1.9         .00         .19         .00         (.04)           Professional identification         (.03)         (.06)         (.04)         (.04)           Political declogy         -1.9         .00         .01         .91         .05         .34           Politically active         .09         .05         .09         .11         .05         .24           Politically active         .09         .05         .09         .11         .05         .24           Cloud         (.04)         (.077)         (.05)         .25         .28         .17         .05         .35           Independental         .12         .02         .08         .17         .05         .35           Independental         .06         .17         .03         .62         .10         .04           Family politicians         .06         .18         .04         .43         .05         .26           Individualistic         .16         .00         .11         .05         .05         .31           Individualistic         .19         .00         .08         .11         .09         .05           Individualistic         .19         .0 </td <td>Church</td> <td>03</td> <td>.55</td> <td>04</td> <td>.46</td> <td>07</td> <td>.14</td>	Church	03	.55	04	.46	07	.14		
Professional   31   00   -20   00   17   00   17   00   16   17   00   17   00   17   00   18   18   18   18   18   18   18	involvement	(.02)		(.03)		(.03)			
Professional identification         31 00         -20 00         .47 00           Identification         (.03)         (.06)         (.05)           Political ideology         -19 00         .01 91         -05 34           Politically active         .09 .05 -0.99 .11         .05 24           (.04)         (.07)         (.05)           Democratice         .12 .02 .08 .17 .005 .35           (.04)         (.08)         .06 .06           Independenta        06 .17 .03 .6210 .04           (.05)         (.09)         .077           Family politicians        06 .18 .04 .43 .05 .26           (.03)         (.06)         (.05)           Moralistic         .16 .0011 .05 .05 .31           (.03)         (.06)         (.05)           Individualistic         .19 .00 .08 .11         .05 .05           (.03)         (.06)         (.05)           Traditionalistic         .03 .5511 .05 .06 .18           (.02)         (.04)         (.03)           Supervisorb         .03 .4603 .61 .04 .04           (.05)         (.09)         (.07)           Clerkb         .03 .52 .02 .78 .01 .04           (.05)         (.09)         (.07)	Closeness to God	.19 <sup>°</sup>	.00	19	.00	.06	.24		
identification         (.03)         (.06)         (.05)         .34           Political ideology        19         .00         .01         .91         .05         .34           Politically active         .09         .05        09         .11         .05         .24           Democratic³         .12         .02        08         .17        05         .35           Independent³        06         .17         .03         .62        10         .04           Independent³        06         .18         .04         .43         .05         .26           Family politicians        06         .18         .04         .43         .05         .26           (.03)         (.06)         .09         .07         .07         .07         .06         .18         .04         .43         .05         .26         .00         .06         .00         .07         .07         .07         .07         .07         .07         .07         .07         .07         .00         .08         .11         .09         .05         .06         .05         .05         .31         .06         .05         .05         .01         .08         .05 </td <td></td> <td>(.03)</td> <td></td> <td>(.05)</td> <td></td> <td>(.04)</td> <td></td>		(.03)		(.05)		(.04)			
Political ideology	Professional	.31	.00	20	.00	.17	.00		
Color	identification	(.03)		(.06)		(.05)			
Politically active	Political ideology	19	.00	.01	.91	05	.34		
Democratic³         (.04)         (.07)         (.05)           Democratic³         .12         .02        08         .17        05         .35           (.04)         (.08)         (.06)  .		(.02)		(.04)		(.04)			
Democratic³         .12         .02        08         .17        05         .35           Independent³        06         .17         .03         .62        10         .04           Family politicians        06         .18         .04         .43         .05         .26           Moralistic         .16         .00        11         .05         .05         .31           Moralistic         .16         .00        11         .05         .05         .31           Individualistic        19         .00         .08         .11        09         .05           Individualistic         .03         .55        11         .05         .06         .18           Individualistic         .03         .55        11         .05         .06         .18           Individualistic         .03         .46        03         .61         .04         .40           Individualistic         .03         .46        03         .61         .04         .40           Individualistic         .03         .46        03         .61         .04         .40           Individualistic         .03         .46	Politically active	.09	.05	09	.11	.05	.24		
Independent*		(.04)		(.07)		(.05)			
Independente	Democratica	.12	.02	08	.17	05	.35		
Family politicians		(.04)		(80.)		(.06)			
Family politicians	Independenta	06	.17	.03	.62	10	.04		
Moralistic       (.03)       (.06)       (.05)       .31         Individualistic      19       .00       .08       .11      09       .05         Individualistic      19       .00       .08       .11      09       .05         Traditionalistic       .03       .55      11       .05       .06       .18         (.02)       (.04)       (.03)       .06       .18       .06       .18         Supervisorb       .03       .46      03       .61       .04       .40         Supervisorb       .03       .46      03       .61       .04       .40         Clerkb      03       .52       .02       .78       .01       .84         (.05)       (.05)       (.10)       (.08)       .77         Assessorb      06       .21      04       .42       .06       .17         Highway       .04       .39      02       .68       .11       .02         commissionerb       (.06)       .22       .10       .07      02       .67         Age       .06       .18      01       .89      02       .62		(.05)		(.09)		(.07)			
Moralistic         .16         .00        11         .05         .05         .31           Individualistic        19         .00         .08         .11        09         .05           Traditionalistic         .03         .55        11         .05         .06         .18           Supervisorb         .03         .46        03         .61         .04         .40           Clerkb        03         .52         .02         .78         .01         .84           Clerkb        03         .52         .02         .78         .01         .84           Assessorb        06         .21        04         .42         .06         .17           Highway         .04         .39        02         .68         .11         .02           commissionerb         (.06)         (.11)         (.09)         (.09)           Age         .06         .22         .10         .07        02         .67           Gender        06         .18        01         .89        02         .62           Gender        06         .18        01         .89        02         .62 <td>Family politicians</td> <td>06</td> <td>.18</td> <td>.04</td> <td>.43</td> <td>.05</td> <td>.26</td>	Family politicians	06	.18	.04	.43	.05	.26		
Individualistic   Company   Compan		(.03)		(.06)		(.05)			
Individualistic        19         .00         .08         .11        09         .05           Traditionalistic         .03         .55        11         .05         .06         .18           Supervisorb         .03         .46        03         .61         .04         .40           Clerkb        03         .52         .02         .78         .01         .84           (.05)         (.05)         (.10)         (.08)         .44         .40         .42         .06         .17         .60         .17         .60         .17         .60         .17         .60         .17         .60         .17         .60         .17         .60         .17         .60         .17         .60         .17         .60         .18         .11         .02         .00         .00         .00 <td>Moralistic</td> <td>.16</td> <td>.00</td> <td>11</td> <td>.05</td> <td>.05</td> <td>.31</td>	Moralistic	.16	.00	11	.05	.05	.31		
Traditionalistic		(.03)							
Traditionalistic         .03         .55        11         .05         .06         .18           Supervisorb         .03         .46        03         .61         .04         .40           Clerkb        03         .52         .02         .78         .01         .84           Assessorb        06         .21         .04         .42         .06         .17           Cloph         .05         (.10)         (.10)         (.08)         .11         .02           Commissionerb         (.06)         (.11)         (.09)         .09         .03         .68         .11         .02           Gender        06         .18        01         .89        02         .62           Education         .03         .53         .10 </td <td>Individualistic</td> <td></td> <td>.00</td> <td></td> <td>.11</td> <td>09</td> <td>.05</td>	Individualistic		.00		.11	09	.05		
Supervisorb       (.02)       (.04)       (.03)         Clerkb       .03       .46      03       .61       .04       .40         Clerkb      03       .52       .02       .78       .01       .84         (.05)       (.10)       (.08)         Assessorb      06       .21      04       .42       .06       .17         (.05)       (.10)       (.10)       (.08)         Highway       .04       .39      02       .68       .11       .02         commissionerb       (.06)       (.11)       (.09)       .08         Age       .06       .22       .10       .07      02       .67         Gender      06       .18      01       .89      02       .62         Gender      06       .18      01       .89      02       .62         Education       .03       .53       .10       .08       .02       .73         Income       .00       .94      01       .87      07       .12         Military service      02       .62      02       .73       .06       .19         N		(.03)		(.06)		(.05)			
Supervisorb       .03       .46      03       .61       .04       .40         Clerkb      03       .52       .02       .78       .01       .84         (.05)       (.10)       (.08)         Assessorb      06       .21      04       .42       .06       .17         Highway       .04       .39      02       .68       .11       .02         commissionerb       (.06)       (.11)       (.09)       .09         Age       .06       .22       .10       .07      02       .67         (.02)       (.04)       (.07)       (.06)       .02       .62         Gender      06       .18      01       .89      02       .62         Education       .03       .53       .10       .08       .02       .73         (.02)       (.03)       (.02)       (.03)       (.02)         Income       .00       .94      01       .87      07       .12         (.04)       (.03)       (.02)       (.02)       (.02)       (.02)         Military service      02       .62      02       .73       .06       .19<	Traditionalistic		.55		.05		.18		
Clerkb -0.03 .52 .0.02 .78 .01 .84 .01 .84 .05 .05 .05 .01 .00 .08 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00									
Clerkb        03         .52         .02         .78         .01         .84           (.05)         (.10)         (.08)           Assessorb        06         .21        04         .42         .06         .17           (.05)         (.10)         (.08)           Highway         .04         .39        02         .68         .11         .02           commissionerb         (.06)         (.11)         (.09)         (.09)         .06         .22         .10         .07        02         .67           Gender        06         .18        01         .89        02         .62           (.04)         (.07)         (.06)         (.06)         .00         .	Supervisor <sup>b</sup>		.46		.61		.40		
Assessor <sup>b</sup> 06 .2104 .42 .06 .17 (.05) (.10) (.08)  Highway .04 .3902 .68 .11 .02 commissioner <sup>b</sup> (.06) (.11) (.09)  Age .06 .22 .10 .07 .02 .67 (.03)  Gender06 .1801 .89 .02 .62 (.04) (.06)  Education .03 .53 .10 .08 .02 .73 (.02)  Income .00 .94 .01 .87 .07 .12 (.01)  Military service02 .62 .02 .73 .06 .19 (.04)  N .311 .336 .337  Adjusted R2 .52 .24 .45  F .15.97 .5.89 .13.30  Significance .00 .00 .00									
Assessor <sup>b</sup> 06 .2104 .42 .06 .17 (.05) (.10) (.08)  Highway .04 .3902 .68 .11 .02 commissioner <sup>b</sup> (.06) (.11) (.09)  Age .06 .22 .10 .0702 .67 (.03)  Gender .06 .1801 .8902 .62 (.04) (.07) (.06)  Education .03 .53 .10 .08 .02 .73 (.02)  Income .00 .9401 .8707 .12 (.01) (.02)  Military service .02 .6202 .73 .06 .19 (.06)  N	Clerk <sup>b</sup>		.52		.78		.84		
Highway       .04       .39      02       .68       .11       .02         commissionerb       (.06)       (.11)       (.09)         Age       .06       .22       .10       .07      02       .67         (.02)       (.04)       (.04)       (.03)         Gender      06       .18      01       .89      02       .62         (.04)       (.07)       (.06)       (.06)         Education       .03       .53       .10       .08       .02       .73         (.02)       (.03)       (.02)         Income       .00       .94      01       .87      07       .12         (.01)       (.02)       (.02)       (.02)         Military service      02       .62      02       .73       .06       .19         (.04)       (.04)       (.08)       (.06)       .06       .19         N       311       336       337         Adjusted R2       .52       .24       .45         F       15.97       5.89       13.30         Significance       .00       .00       .00									
Highway commissionerb       .04       .39      02       .68       .11       .02         Age       .06       .22       .10       .07      02       .67         (.02)       (.04)       (.04)       (.03)       (.03)         Gender      06       .18      01       .89      02       .62         (.04)       (.07)       (.06)       (.06)       (.06)       (.06)       (.06)       (.06)       (.06)       (.06)       (.06)       (.02)       .73       (.06)       (.02)       .73       (.02)       .73       (.02)       .02       .73       (.02)       (.02)       .02       .73       .06       .19       (.06)       .19       (.06)       .19       (.06)       .19       (.06)       .19       .06       .19       .06       .19       .06       .19       .06       .19       .06       .19       .06       .19       .06       .19       .06       .19       .06       .19       .06       .19       .06       .19       .06       .19       .06       .06       .06       .06       .06       .06       .06       .06       .06       .06       .06       .06       .06       <	Assessorb		.21		.42		.17		
commissionerb         (.06)         (.11)         (.09)           Age         .06         .22         .10         .07        02         .67           (.02)         (.04)         (.04)         (.03)         (.03)         (.02)         .62           Gender        06         .18        01         .89        02         .62           (.04)         (.07)         (.06)         (.06)         (.06)         (.06)         (.06)           Education         .03         .53         .10         .08         .02         .73           (.02)         (.02)         (.03)         (.02)         (.02)           Income         .00         .94        01         .87        07         .12           (.01)         (.02)         (.02)         (.02)         (.02)           Military service        02         .62        02         .73         .06         .19           (.04)         (.04)         (.08)         (.06)         (.06)           N         311         336         337           Adjusted R2         .52         .24         .45           F         15.97         5.89         13.30									
Age       .06       .22       .10       .07      02       .67         (.02)       (.04)       (.04)       (.03)      02       .62         Gender      06       .18      01       .89      02       .62         (.04)       (.07)       (.06)       (.06)       .06       .06       .02       .73         Education       .03       .53       .10       .08       .02       .73         (.02)       (.03)       (.02)       (.02)       (.02)         Income       .00       .94      01       .87      07       .12         (.01)       (.02)       (.02)       (.02)       (.02)         Military service      02       .62      02       .73       .06       .19         N       311       336       337         Adjusted R2       .52       .24       .45         F       15.97       5.89       13.30         Significance       .00       .00       .00			.39		.68		.02		
Gender       (.02)       (.04)       (.03)         Gender      06       .18      01       .89      02       .62         (.04)       (.07)       (.06)         Education       .03       .53       .10       .08       .02       .73         (.02)       (.02)       (.03)       (.02)       (.02)         Income       .00       .94      01       .87      07       .12         (.01)       (.02)       (.02)       (.02)         Military service      02       .62      02       .73       .06       .19         N       311       336       337         Adjusted R2       .52       .24       .45         F       15.97       5.89       13.30         Significance       .00       .00       .00	commissioner <sup>b</sup>								
Gender      06       .18      01       .89      02       .62         (.04)       (.07)       (.06)       (.06)         Education       .03       .53       .10       .08       .02       .73         (.02)       (.03)       (.02)       (.02)         Income       .00       .94      01       .87      07       .12         (.01)       (.02)       (.02)       (.02)         Military service      02       .62      02       .73       .06       .19         (.04)       (.04)       (.08)       (.06)       .06       .19         N       311       336       337         Adjusted R2       .52       .24       .45         F       15.97       5.89       13.30         Significance       .00       .00       .00	Age		.22		.07		.67		
(.04)       (.07)       (.06)         Education       .03       .53       .10       .08       .02       .73         (.02)       (.03)       (.02)       (.02)         Income       .00       .94      01       .87      07       .12         (.01)       (.02)       (.02)       (.02)         Military service      02       .62      02       .73       .06       .19         (.04)       (.08)       (.08)       (.06)         N       311       336       337         Adjusted R2       .52       .24       .45         F       15.97       5.89       13.30         Significance       .00       .00       .00									
Education       .03       .53       .10       .08       .02       .73         (.02)       (.03)       (.02)       (.02)         Income       .00       .94      01       .87      07       .12         (.01)       (.02)       (.02)       (.02)         Military service      02       .62      02       .73       .06       .19         (.04)       (.08)       (.08)       (.06)         N       311       336       337         Adjusted R2       .52       .24       .45         F       15.97       5.89       13.30         Significance       .00       .00       .00	Gender		.18		.89		.62		
Column (.02)									
Income       .00       .94      01       .87      07       .12         (.01)       (.02)       (.02)       (.02)         Military service      02       .62      02       .73       .06       .19         (.04)       (.08)       (.06)         N       311       336       337         Adjusted R2       .52       .24       .45         F       15.97       5.89       13.30         Significance       .00       .00       .00	Education		.53		.08		.73		
(.01)     (.02)     (.02)       Military service    02     .62    02     .73     .06     .19       (.04)     (.08)     (.06)       N     311     336     337       Adjusted R2     .52     .24     .45       F     15.97     5.89     13.30       Significance     .00     .00     .00									
Military service    02     .62    02     .73     .06     .19       (.04)     (.08)     (.06)       N     311     336     337       Adjusted R2     .52     .24     .45       F     15.97     5.89     13.30       Significance     .00     .00     .00	Income		.94		.87		.12		
(.04)     (.08)     (.06)       N     311     336     337       Adjusted R2     .52     .24     .45       F     15.97     5.89     13.30       Significance     .00     .00     .00									
N     311     336     337       Adjusted R2     .52     .24     .45       F     15.97     5.89     13.30       Significance     .00     .00     .00	Military service		.62		.73		.19		
Adjusted R2       .52       .24       .45         F       15.97       5.89       13.30         Significance       .00       .00       .00									
F       15.97       5.89       13.30         Significance       .00       .00       .00									
Significance         .00         .00									
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